This paper provides a description of issues that are important in determining the macroeconomic effects of tax policy changes. We discuss the role of assumptions about general macroeconomic modeling issues like market behavioral parameters, and the actions of fiscal and monetary authorities. Estimating the revenue feedback effects of tax policy also requires several applied measurement issues that do not typically arise in macroeconomic modeling. Each of these issues introduces significant sources of uncertainty into the macroeconomic analysis of tax policy. We use simulations of a hypothetical 10 percent cut in individual income tax rates to illustrate issues and challenges.
INTRODUCTION
T his paper provides a description of issues that are important in determining the macroeconomic effects of tax policy changes. The theoretical issues in modeling the effects of tax policy on economic growth are the same as the theoretical issues involved generally in macroeconomic modeling. Tax policy can affect both the long-run capacity of the economy, and short-run fluctuations in aggregate demand. These two types of effects are typically analyzed with different types of economic models. Forecasting the magnitude of these effects requires numerous assumptions about individuals' and firms' reactions to changes in their after-tax income.
The effects of current tax policy on future economic growth are also dependent on the actions of several government institutions, including domestic fiscal policy makers, the Federal Reserve Board, and foreign governments and central banks. Some macroeconomic models explicitly incorporate varying assumptions about the actions of one or more of these institutions. To the extent that institutional responses are not explicitly modeled, the market-clearing assumptions within each model effectively embody specific assumptions about the roles of the institutions.
To illustrate the effects of some of these issues, we simulate a hypothetical 10 percent cut in individual income tax rates using two different types of macroeconomic models. These simulations highlight, in particular, the sensitivity of results to assumptions about labor supply responsiveness, monetary policy, and fiscal policy.
Estimating the revenue feedback effects of tax policy requires addressing these well-known theoretical issues; it also requires addressing several applied, measurement issues that do not typically arise in macroeconomic modeling. The applied issues include modeling of the proposed policy change, which incorporates relevant details of the present law tax code, as well as translations between taxable income and the income flows provided in the National Income and Product Accounts. Each of these issues introduces significant sources of uncertainty into the macroeconomic analysis of tax policy. We describe our use of Joint Committee on Taxation microsimulation tax calculators to address these issues.
MODELING INDIVIDUAL AND MARKET BEHAVIOR

Long-term growth
Tax policy can affect long-term economic growth by altering taxpayers' incentives to work, save, and invest. When individuals work more, or save more, thus making more of their income available to businesses to invest in productive equipment and structures, the productive capacity of the economy expands. Tax policy affects investment demand by changing the after-tax rate of return on capital; and it affects the supply of funds available for investment by affecting savings incentives. Because changes in tax rates can affect both savings and labor incentives with offsetting income and substitution effects, theory alone does not provide clear guidance as to how much growth a specific policy change is likely to produce. It is up to empirical observation to supply information about the relative strengths of these types of incentives for different types of taxpayers under different economic conditions.
The responsiveness of labor supply to tax policy changes can be affected by employers' ability to accommodate incremental changes in work hours, the amount of discretionary time that individuals have available for work, and individuals' liquidity constraints. Typically, the empirical literature indicates that the largest labor supply response comes from secondary workers (individuals whose wages make a smaller contribution to household income than the primary earner in the household) and underemployed individuals entering the labor market. 1 The responsiveness of savings can be important in modeling the growth effects of tax policy because the amount of available savings can be an important determinant of how quickly business investment responds to tax incentives. An individual's propensity to save is affected by her motives for saving, her expectation of future earnings, and her liquidity constraints. Empirical estimates of individual savings response to changes in the taxation of returns to savings (income from capital) have generally ranged from slightly negative to positive. 2 In addition to the domestic savings response, the responsiveness of international capital is also important in determining the effect of changes in domestic tax policy on investment, GDP, and tax revenues.
While increased investment can make a permanent contribution to long-term growth through a gradual build-up in the stock of productive capital, in the shortrun, these effects tend to be quite small. In contrast, an increase in the availability of labor can produce a measurable feedback effect to the economy more quickly.
An indirect long-term factor affecting willingness to work is induced changes in before-tax wages due to the policy. To the extent that the investment incentives in the proposed policy lead to an increase in the build-up of business capital stock, labor productivity will increase, leading to an increase in wage rates. The increasing wage rates provide additional incentives, similar to those resulting from statutory tax rate changes, for taxpayers to alter their willingness to work.
The positive effects on growth generated by tax cuts can be offset by increases in federal government debt due to a net reduction in tax receipts as a result of the policy. Unless individuals increase their savings enough to finance completely the increased debt, the increased federal government borrowing may reduce the amount of domestic capital available to finance private investment. 3 The resulting reduction in national saving may lead to a reduction in investment depending on the mobility of international capital flows. Some models eliminate crowding out by assuming a completely offsetting increase in foreign investment in the United States. Without such an inflow, the government and private firms would compete for the supply of available funds, and interest rates would rise to equate the demand and supply of funds. The modeling of international capital flows in response to tax policy changes is fairly rudimentary in the macroeconomic models we have employed. Another possible response to government borrowing, not commonly discussed in modern economic literature (but perhaps likely to make a comeback in light of recent Federal Reserve Board concern about the possibility of deflation) is that the Federal Reserve Board would increase the money supply to provide resources for financing federal government deficits.
Short-run Stimulus
Under certain conditions, changes in tax policy can result in a temporary increase in economic growth by stimulating demand for additional output. To the extent that some potentially productive resources are not being used to capacity, the demand stimulus could increase output by bringing those resources back into production. The responsiveness of the economy to fiscal policy also depends crucially on how the Federal Reserve Board reacts. To the extent that the Federal Reserve Board determines the policy is likely to stimulate demand beyond what could be supplied by excess capacity, it is likely to increase interest rates to suppress the demand.
Since significant underemployment of resources is not likely to persist for prolonged periods, there is considerable disagreement among economists as to whether such short-term stimulus is necessary from a policy standpoint; because the political process is too cumbersome for fiscal stimulus to be well-timed, there is disagreement as to whether such policy is even desirable. Because of the temporary and uncertain nature of these effects, there is disagreement among economists as to whether these effects should be considered at all in a macroeconomic analysis of tax policy. Some economists argue that ignoring temporary stimulus effects is equivalent to assuming that the Federal Reserve Board acts to offset exactly any fiscal stimulus each period.
Generally, econometric forecasting models are most often used to analyze short-run stimulus effects, while equilibrium models are most often used to analyze long-run growth effects. In recent years, many policy makers have been interested in an analysis of both types of effects with respect to major tax policy initiatives. This dual interest has raised the visibility of the influence the choice of modeling framework can have on the results produced. 4
Sample Simulations
To illustrate the influence that assumptions about labor supply responsiveness and short-run demand effects can have on the forecasted macroeconomic impact of tax policy, we ran eight simulations of a 10 percent cut in individual income tax rates using the Joint Committee on Taxation's Macroeconomic Equilibrium Growth (MEG) model. The MEG model solves for a disequilibrium adjustment path in the short run, and then converges to long run equilibrium consistent with neoclassical growth theory. The consumption function in the MEG model is derived from life cycle theory. The MEG model provides two alternative approaches to modeling labor supply. 5 The first approach determines labor supply for different groups of taxpayers using an equation of the labor force par-ticipation rate for each group. Labor force participation is calculated as the sum of income-weighted averages of the labor force participation rates of four groups of taxpayers: (1) low-income primary earners, (2) other primary earners, (3) low income secondary earners, and (4) other secondary earners. The second approach uses the labor supply function that corresponds to the case in which consumption and leisure are jointly determined in the individual's utility maximization problem. 6 The simulations presented below use the first, ad hoc disaggregated labor supply mode. The income and substitution elasticities used in these simulations appear in Table 1 . Table  1 also contains the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and rate of time preference parameters that determine savings and consumption in MEG.
The analysis provided below is based on modeling the effects of the proposal under several different assumptions about the actions of workers, producers, and govern-Labor supply elasticities in disaggregated labor supply Table 5 . Table 2 presents the results of eight different simulations of this proposal. Row (a) shows the proposal with no offsetting spending cut or tax increase. Row (b) shows the same proposal with labor supply response parameters reduced. Row (c) shows the effects of the proposal when accompanied by an offsetting reduction in "nonproductive" government spending. Row (d) shows the effects of rescinding the tax cut immediately after the budget period. 8 In each row, the simulations are run under a reactive and a neutral response from the Federal Reserve Board.
Real GDP
This proposal can result in both short and long run growth in the economy if it is accompanied by offsetting reductions in federal government spending, thus eliminating an increase in the deficit, and eliminating the possible crowding out of private investment. If there is no offsetting reduction in government spending, the size of the economy, as measured by the percent change in inflation-adjusted ("real") Gross Domestic Product (GDP), can be expected to grow by 0.2 to 0.3 percent in the years immediately following enactment of the proposal. As the last line in the GDP section of the table shows, the decline in GDP would be cut in half by repealing the tax reduction at the end of the budget period.
Depending on how activist the Federal Reserve Board is assumed to be, real GDP could begin to decline by the end of the ten-year budget horizon. If the Federal Reserve Board acts to restrict the demand stimulus provided by the proposal, with no fiscal balance assumption, GDP declines by 0.5 percent on average during the second five years of the proposal. In simulations that assume a neutral monetary policy GDP growth is positive, although by less than 0.03 percent, in the second five years. The effects of crowding out are mitigated in these simulations by additional liquidity supplied by the Federal Reserve Board. The decline in the growth of GDP as a result of crowding out is very gradual, with the decline in GDP reaching approximately -1 percent of the baseline level in the long run (after about 30 years).
Labor Supply
The main growth effects of this proposal come from the responses of workers to the reduction in the average and marginal tax rates on wages. Table 2 includes results of simulations with a lowered labor supply response parameter, to show the sensitivity of results to this proposal. Generally, workers are expected to be more willing to work if marginal tax rates decrease, because the after-tax return to additional labor increases. Conversely, they are expected to respond negatively to reductions in average tax rates, as lower average tax rates increase the after-tax value of their existing income. The net effect of the marginal and average tax rate increases is projected to increase labor supply by approximately three-tenths of a percent in the first part of the budget period, or two-tenths in the simulations with lower behavioral response parameters. This response is muted in the second half of the budget window both because the percentage decrease in tax rates is smaller and because pre-tax wages are reduced due to a decline in the capital stock. In the long run, this response is muted in the simulation that repeals the tax cut after the budget period, and increased if government spending is cut to finance the increase in taxes. It should be noted that the increases in labor supply in these simulations are very similar to the increases in real GDP. This result reflects both the fact that labor supply responses have more immediate effects on economic growth than investment responses and that the policy simulated mostly affects labor.
Because labor supply response is driven by reactions to marginal and average tax rate changes, monetary policy has no effect on the size of the labor force. Monetary policy does have an effect on private sector employment, as employment is determined by the demand for labor as well as by the willingness of people to work. Neutral Federal Reserve Board policy allows for more hiring, raising employment by 0.05 to 0.07 percent within the ten-year budget period relative to more restrictive monetary policy. However, this trend is reversed in the long run as the activity induced by temporary demand stimulus reverts to a stable long run relationship. Table 2 shows changes in long-term interest rates and changes in the capital stock in response to this proposal. The only incentive for increased investment in this proposal is the reduction in tax rates on individual income from capital, which, in the MEG model, provides an additional incentive to individual taxpayers to save. However, offsetting the positive effects of the small increase in private savings, the decrease in revenues leads to a reduction in national savings in the form of rising federal government debt. This effect is reflected in the rising interest rates shown in Table 2 for all simulations other those with offsetting decreases in government spending. The increased interest rates due to the increased deficit reduce the capital stock relative to baseline levels. The decrease in the stock of capital relative to the baseline occurs throughout the simulation, except when the tax cut is offset by decreases in government spending. With an offsetting increase in taxes after 2012, the long run decline in the capital stock is smaller than with no fiscal offset.
Capital Stock
MODEL STRUCTURE AND FISCAL OFFSET ASSUMPTIONS
An important modeling framework issue is whether behavior is modeled such that individuals act myopically, or with perfect foresight. If individuals are forward looking, then current behavior will depend on future values of government spending and on current and future tax rates. To the extent that individuals make decisions based on their expectations about current and future after-tax wages, the impact of changes in tax policy on future taxes and government spending may also affect the distribution of consumption and labor supply over an individual's lifetime. Rational individuals who anticipate that their marginal tax rates are expected to increase in the future will choose to work more in the present, when the return to work is the highest (deferring their consumption of leisure), while individuals who anticipate that their after-tax income will decline in the future will save more in the present in order to ensure a greater level of consumption in the future.
Changes in tax policy may create or worsen a fiscally unstable economy, thereby necessitating a change in taxes or spending in the future to reach a sustainable equilibrium. Issuing debt, increasing other taxes, and decreasing spending are all possible methods that could be used to finance changes in tax policy. If taxes are increased to close the fiscal gap, the outcome will depend on whether the tax offset is a tax on labor income, capital income or both. If the fiscal policy offset is achieved by decreasing government spending, the outcome will depend on whether or not the cut in government spending is valued by individuals. 9 Whether the fiscal offset is implemented after five years, ten years, or longer, also plays a role in determining the effects of assuming a fiscal offset. Finally, the effects of assuming a fiscal offset are diminished for temporary policies since the size of the offset is reduced. 10 9 In many macroeconomic models, government consumption of goods and services does not enter the individual's maximization problem, and thus, these models implicitly assume government consumption is valueless to individuals. Valued government spending is modeled as a transfer payment. Another type of government spending that could be cut is investment spending. This could have substantially different effects from cutting other types of government spending. A decrease in government investment is not well modeled in macroeconomic models. However, investment is often specified in an ad hoc manner, and is a small percent of government spending. 10 We assume that the fiscal offset finances the deficit in each period after the fiscal offset is implemented. This implies that the fiscal offset does not cover the full cost of the proposal but only future deficits that result from a policy change.
Model structure plays a role in determining what is assumed about how changes in tax policy are financed. Perfect foresight models require fiscal policy to be sustainable to solve for current and future values of economic variables. Changes in tax policy may be debt financed for lengthy periods, but a fiscal policy offset must be assumed eventually to assure a stable solution to the model. The nature and timing of the assumed fiscal policy offset may affect the predicted effects of changes in tax policy. Other types of models do not require fiscal policy to be sustainable to predict the effects of tax policy in the short and medium term but are unstable in the long run if a fiscal policy offset is not assumed. In these models, the assumption of a fiscal policy offset only impacts the predicted effects of changes in tax policy occurring after the offset is enacted. 11
Model Structure
To examine the impacts of different fiscal offsets in a forward-looking model, we use a dynamic overlapping generations life cycle model to produce five simulations of a 10 percent cut in wage tax rates. This model combines features from Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Goulder and Summers (1989) . 12 Individual behavior is modeled using an overlapping generations framework that consists of 55 cohorts, denoted by ages that range from zero to 54, as the individual life span is known with certainty to be 55 years. Each generation is represented by a single individual, who has an economic life span of 55 years, works for the first 45 of those years, and is retired for the last ten. Consistent with the lifecycle theory, the model assumes that individuals borrow money in the early years of life, pay back their debts and save for retirement in their prime working years, and draw down their savings during retirement. Under this theory, lifetime consumption tends to be flatter than lifetime income. In addition, the model includes the following features: tax deferred savings, a simple bequest motive, a model of the Social Security system, payroll taxes, and progressive tax rate on wages. The income tax is modeled as a progressive tax on labor income coupled with effective marginal tax rates on capital income. Capital income is divided into dividends, interest, capital gains, and business income. The tax rate on capital gains is an effective annual accrual rate, taking into account the benefits of deferral of tax until gains are realized and tax exemption of gains transferred at death.
On the production side, the model assumes that firm managers act to maximize the value of the firm in a perfectly competitive environment in the absence of uncertainty. The approach utilized is based on Tobin's "q" theory of investment, as extended to include adjustment costs by Hayashi (1982) . Four separate production sectors are modeled using a constant elasticity of scale production function. Firm values for a traditional view corporate sector, a joint new view and non-corporate sector, a rental-housing sector, and owner-housing sector are calculated explicitly. Firms finance new investment through retained earnings, issuing debt and issuing new shares of equity (in the traditional view corporate sector). Firms pay dividends equal to constant fraction of after-tax profits net of economic depreciation, and new debt issues are a constant fraction of net investment. For tax purposes, firms are allowed to depreciate capital more rapidly than the economic rate of depreciation. The model distinguishes between the present value of depreciation deductions on existing and 11 In perfect foresight models it is impossible to model a baseline in which fiscal policy is unsustainable. Other types of models can allow the effects of tax policy changes to be measured against a fiscally unstable baseline. 12 For a technical description of a similar model see Diamond (2000) . future capital. In addition, the model includes a quadratic adjustment cost function that increases the cost of investing in and installing new capital goods.
The model assumes that the resources in the economy are fully employed in each year and therefore does not account for short-run disequilibria (i.e., cyclical movements in the economy) in the markets for labor, capital, or other goods that would occur during transition periods. The model is calibrated to National Income and Product Account ("NIPA") (produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the U.S. Department of Commerce) data for total production and to SOI data for taxable income. Table 3 presents the behavioral parameters used in these simulations. Table 4 presents the results of five different simulations, which assume the following fiscal offsets: (a) a cut in non-valued government consumption after 2012; (b) a cut in valued government spending after 2012; (c) an increase in wage taxes after 2012; (d) an increase in taxes on capital after 2012; and (e) a cut in valued government spending after 2022. To simplify the analysis, the changes in tax rates that are used in the simulations are average changes over the first three years (2003) (2004) (2005) and the last seven years (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) .
Simulation Results
In the first three years, the marginal tax rate decreases by 7.4 percent and the average tax rate decreases by 7.3 percent. In every year after 2006, the marginal tax rate decreases by 4.1 percent and the average tax rate decreases by 4.8 percent.
In these simulations, the fiscal offset is equal to roughly 50 billion dollars in each year. This corresponds to a decrease in non-valued government spending equal to a 7.5 percent cut in government consumption, a decrease in valued government spending equal to 23.6 percent of non-social security transfers, an increase in the average and marginal wage tax rate equal to 7.9 percent, and an increase in average capital tax rates equal to 14 percent.
The simulations indicate that the decrease in wage taxes beginning in 2003 financed by a cut in non-valued government spending would result in an increase in GDP equal to 0.17 percent in the first five years after enactment, and a 0.04 percent decrease in GDP in the long run. The non-residential capital stock would decrease relative to baseline values by 0.03 percent in the first five years and by 0.39 percent in the long run. Labor supply would increase by 0.21 percent in the first five years after enactment when the marginal and average tax rates are cut by nearly equal percentages. From 2008 through 2012, labor supply would increase by less than 0.1 percent because (1) opposed to the indirect response that occurs when non-valued government spending is cut, because valued government spending enters the individual's utility maximization problem. The decrease in valued government spending is modeled as a decrease in non social security transfer payments. Thus, the sensitivity of labor supply to changes in income, the income effect, plays an important role in determining the effect of a decrease in valued government spending on labor supply. In simulation (b) shown in Table 4 , individuals increase labor supply and saving in current periods to smooth consumption over their lifetimes in response to a future cut in valued government spending. Labor supply increases by 0.27 percent in the first five years after enactment and by 0.15 percent on average in the period 2008 through 2012. In the long run, labor supply increases by 0.19 percent. Since a cut in valued government spending is a pure income effect, it increases labor supply in every period after the date of enactment. The increase in labor supply attributable to this effect is between 0.05 and 0.1 percent. The increase in private consumption is smaller in this case as individuals increase saving to smooth consumption. In the long run, the increase in saving results in a larger capital stock and higher wage rate and thus increases labor supply relative to the simulation that assumed a cut in non-valued government spending.
The decrease in wage taxes could also be financed by an increase in taxes after 2012; this could take the form of an increase in tax rates on labor or capital. An increase in tax rates on labor or capital results in similar increases in GDP and labor supply in the first five years after enactment. With an increase in tax rates on capital, the capital stock declines gradually over time, reducing the real wage and thus the incentive to supply labor. However, if an increase in the tax rate on capital is used to close the fiscal gap, there is a 0.05 percent increase in GDP, a small increase in labor supply equal to 0.09 percent, and a 0.2 percent decline in the non-residential capital stock relative to baseline values. In the second five years, financing the tax cut by increasing wage taxes results in an increase in GDP, labor supply, and the capital stock equal to 0.14 percent, 0.15 percent, and 0.07 percent, respectively. In the long run, a tax increase on labor results in smaller declines in GDP, the non-residential capital stock, and private consumption and leisure than a tax increase in capital.
The effects of a wage tax fiscal offset are similar to the effects of a cut in valued government spending. The main difference between these two financing options is that an increase in the tax rate on labor after 2012 induces individuals to increase labor supply in low tax years (before 2013) and to reduce labor supply after the fiscal offset is enacted. Thus, in the long run, financing the tax cut with a cut in valued government spending instead of an increase in the tax rate on wage income results in smaller decreases in GDP and the capital stock and a larger increase in labor supply.
The type of fiscal offset is not the sole determinant of the effects of closing the fiscal gap; the timing and size of the fiscal offset are also important. The last simulation in Table 4 shows that delaying the fiscal offset, implemented as a cut in valued government expenditure, until 20 years after the enactment of a permanent decrease in the wage tax reduces the build up of capital, the increase in labor supply, and the increase in GDP in every year. In the long run, this results in more crowding out and thus reduces the size of the capital stock and GDP relative to a fiscal offset implemented after ten years.
Intertemporal models with forward looking expectations require assumptions about how deficits will be financed to solve for the effects of an unsustainable tax cut. As illustrated above, the effects of a change in tax policy are determined in part by whether the fiscal gap is closed by cutting spending or raising taxes, by the type of spending (valued or non-valued) or the type of tax that is used as the fiscal offset, the assumption of when the fiscal offset is enacted, and the temporary or permanent nature of the tax cut. Other types of models are capable of estimating the effects of changes in tax policy assuming the change in policy is deficit financed into the out years until the economy is unstable.
The effects of the fiscal offset also depend on the necessary size of the change in fiscal policy needed to offset the increase in government deficits. For a temporary change in tax policy, it is assumed that the fiscal offset finances only the interest payments on the additional stock of debt accumulated while the tax policy is in effect, higher interest payments on the existing stock of debt, and changes in the ratio of deficits to GDP. The importance of the fiscal offset assumption is diminished for temporary tax policy changes that do not create permanent deficits.
APPLIED MODELING ISSUES
One of the biggest challenges in modeling the effects of tax policy arises from the complexity of the existing tax code. On the individual side, the combination of the progressive rate structure with refundable and non-refundable tax credits, the phasing out of both credits and deductions at varying levels of adjusted gross income, and the alternative minimum tax system means that even a simple proposal such as an across-the-board rate cut can affect different taxpayers differently. Similarly, on the business side, the combination of specialized deductions, depreciation schedules, expenditure and production credits with carry-back and carry-forward rules and the corporate alternative minimum tax means a seemingly straightforward change can have unanticipated effects. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has developed detailed microsimulation models for use in evaluating the effects of many of the tax proposals they are asked to estimate. The level of detail provided by these models is far greater than that embedded in the behavioral equations in macroeconomic models. However, information derived from these models is used to improve the accuracy of the modeling of specific tax proposals in all of the macroeconomic models used by the Joint Committee staff. Specifically, these models are used to calculate average and marginal tax rates on each source of income modeled within the different models under present law, and to compute changes in these rates under the proposal, which are the primary input of tax policy in macroeconomic models.
The largest microsimulation model employed by the Joint Committee staff is the individual income tax model, which uses as its primary data source a random sample of approximately 164,000 individual income tax returns. This file is provided by the Statistics of Income ("SOI") division of the Internal Revenue Service for tax year 1998. It is a nationally representative sample of individual income tax returns, containing detailed information about each taxpayer's sources of income, deductions, and tax liabilities. This data is statistically matched with the March 1999 Current Population Survey ("CPS") to provide demographic and other information not available from income tax returns, and to supplement the income tax return data with information about individuals who do not file income tax returns. The matched file contains data for approximately 224,000 tax filing units and non-filer households.
The Joint Committee staff corporate tax model is a microsimulation model that is similar in structure to the individual tax model. This model uses as its main data source a sample of approximately 140,000 corporate tax returns provided by SOI. The model comprises a detailed set of calculations that replicate the present law construction of taxable income, regular tax and tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax and minimum tax credit. Depending on the requirements of the policy simulation, the corporate model can be run either on a full cross section of sampled tax returns, i.e., one full year, or on a panel of returns constructed from any combination of tax years in the 1987 through 1998 period. This panel feature is particularly useful in tracking net operating losses and credits that can be either carried back or carried forward to other tax years. For example, the corporate alternative minimum tax gives rise to a credit against the regular tax in subsequent years.
As an example of the impact of using the microsimulation model to calculate effective rate changes, Table 5 shows the effective average and marginal rate change derived from the microsimulation model for the proposal to reduce statutory individual income tax rates by 10 percent. The top half shows effective rate changes for a proposal that applies the statutory rate cut to the regular individual income tax, but does not adjust alternative minimum tax liability. The bottom half shows effective rate changes for a proposal that reduces both regular and alternative minimum tax liability. Because of the phasing in and out of various credits and the alternative minimum tax under present law, a 10 percent statutory rate cut in the regular tax with no change to the minimum tax reduces both marginal and average rates by less than 10 percent, and it reduces the marginal rates by less than the average rate. The effective rate changes are much closer to the statutory rate changes when the alternative minimum tax is also adjusted, but they are still not equal to 10 percent.
A practical issue arises out of the use of SOI-based models to characterize tax system changes. Macroeconomic models are generally based on NIPA data. The NIPA definition of various sources of income does not generally conform to the tax definitions of income. In order to make full use of the information coming from the tax models, it is necessary to calibrate the income flows within macroeconomic models to the taxable income flows as measured by the SOI. It is important at the same time not to lose track of the economic income measures that drive the economic behaviors within the models.
The original impetus for this analysis was to explore whether the accuracy of estimates of the effects of tax policy on federal fiscal year budget receipts could be improved by incorporating these effects in revenue estimates. One of the most difficult aspects of modeling revenue feedback effects has turned out to be ensuring that the income flows in the macroeconomic models are compatible with the receipts baseline used in conventional revenue estimating. Even the larger tax policy changes (measured in terms of a gross conventional change in receipts) represent a relatively small amount when compared to the Gross Domestic (or National) Product that macroeconomic models have been designed to predict. Because conventional revenue estimates are calculated relative to a baseline pattern of receipts provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), it is important to try to match predicted present law receipts in the macroeconomic models to CBO's receipts baseline. However, it is also important to allow the behavioral equations in the various macroeconomic models to operate as modeled. For this reason, Joint Committee staff applies "calibration factors" to income tax bases generated in the models. We followed this procedure in the simulations presented above. The calibration factors applied to the simulations presented above appear in Table 6 . Each time a tax proposal affecting a different type of income arises, we have found renewed challenges in accomplishing this task. Calibrating the flows of income from capital is especially problematic because of the necessity of selecting an initial value of capital stock that generates internally consistent returns to capital, capital gains, and depreciation deductions. This effort is particularly important to obtain an accurate analysis of the revenue feedback effects arising from tax policy, as different types of income are taxed at different rates.
CONCLUSION
As the simulations described above demonstrate, just as there are many sources of uncertainty in forecasting the future path of the economy, there are many sources of uncertainty in predicting the probable macroeconomic effects of tax policy. A range of different possible modeling frameworks also introduces uncertainty into this analysis.
Applied issues like the complexity of the existing tax code and the divergence between economic income measures that form the building blocks of macroeconomic models and taxable income introduce additional sources of uncertainty in translating macroeconomic analysis to revenue feedback analysis. We are continuing to refine our bridges between the microsimulation models and macroeconomic models to address these issues. Refinements include improving the map-ping between economic and taxable income using tax data, and disaggregating income flows within the macroeconomic models to improve the modeling of different effects of the policy on different sectors within the economy.
While empirical research over the years has narrowed the range of probable labor supply and savings responses to tax policy, there are some issues on which empirical evidence is less likely to be authoritative, including predicting the responses of monetary and fiscal authorities to the policy change, and modeling the degree to which individuals act with perfect foresight. The most prudent course for analyzing the macroeconomic effects of tax policy at this time is to continue to analyze proposals using multiple assumptions and modeling frameworks, and to enhance our understanding of the sensitivity of results to different modeling assumptions. 
